A Human Rights Based Approach to International Financial Regulatory Standards by Bradlow, Daniel D
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
2018 
A Human Rights Based Approach to International Financial 
Regulatory Standards 
Daniel D. Bradlow 
American University Washington College of Law, bradlow@wcl.amerian.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the International 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bradlow, Daniel D., "A Human Rights Based Approach to International Financial Regulatory Standards" 
(2018). Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals. 940. 
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/940 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ 
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & 
Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington 
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
SouthViews 
No. 171, 5 October 2018
A Human Rights Based Approach to
International Financial Regulatory
Standards
By Daniel D. Bradlow
Globalization and information and communication technologies pushed national
financial regulators to establish international standard setting bodies (SSBs) which
promote non-binding international financial regulatory standards. However, finance
inevitably has social and human rights impacts and the SSBs and their members are
not meeting their responsibility to account for these impacts in their international
standards. This failure means that financial regulators and institutions may under-
estimate the risks associated with their operations leading to misallocations of
credit, less safe financial institutions and less efficient and transparent financial
markets. To avoid this problem, SSBs should adopt a human rights approach to
standard setting. The benefits of doing so will exceed the costs.
La mondialisation et les technologies de l'information et de la communication ont
incité les autorités nationales de réglementation financière à créer des organismes
internationaux de normalisation qui établissent des normes internationales de
réglementation financière non contraignantes. Or, la finance a inévitablement des
répercussions sociales et des répercussions sur les droits humains et ni les
organismes de normalisation ni leurs membres ne les prennent en compte quand ils
élaborent les normes internationales. Les organismes de règlementation financière
et les institutions financières peuvent donc sous-estimer les risques associés à
leurs activités ; il en résulte une mauvaise attribution des crédits, des institutions
financières moins sûres et des marchés financiers moins efficaces et moins
transparents. Pour y remédier, les organismes de normalisation devraient prendre
en compte la dimension des droits humains dans l'élaboration des normes. Les
avantages à en retirer seront plus importants que les coûts.
La mundialización y las tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones han
inducido a las autoridades nacionales de reglamentación a crear órganos
normativos internacionales que establezcan normas de reglamentación
internacionales no vinculantes en el ámbito financiero. Sin embargo, el sistema
financiero afecta inevitablemente a las esferas sociales y de derechos humanos y ni
los órganos normativos internacionales ni sus miembros están asumiendo la
responsabilidad de tomar en cuenta estos efectos en sus normas internacionales.
Esta omisión implica que las autoridades de reglamentación y las instituciones
financieras pueden subestimar los riesgos asociados con sus operaciones lo que
da lugar al otorgamiento desacertado de créditos y hace las instituciones
financieras menos seguras y los mercados financieros menos eficaces y
transparentes. Para evitar ese problema los órganos normativos deben adoptar un
enfoque basado en los derechos humanos en la elaboración de las normas. Los
beneficios de hacerlo serán mayores que los costos.
Historically, finance was essentially a domestic economic activity and financial regulation was viewed as the prerogative of a sovereign
state. This situation had two important policy implications. First, governments could regulate their financial sectors so that it supported
their domestic policy objectives. This meant, for example, that they could decide what types of activities banks and other financial
institutions could undertake, how they should allocate credit and how much risk they should assume.
Second, governments decided how financial institutions should account for the social, and human rights impacts of the projects and
programs that they funded.[1] They could either socialize these costs or compel financial institutions and their clients to account for them
in the planning and budgeting of their transactions.
Over time, globalization and information and communications technologies have undermined national financial regulation. They have
pushed financial regulators to create international standard setting bodies (SSBs) to discuss and agree on non-binding international
financial regulatory standards that facilitate coordination between national regulators. These standards deal with such issues as the
safety and soundness of financial institutions, the operation of efficient and fair financial markets, and the structure and functions of
financial regulatory authorities.
These forces have also exacerbated concerns about the efficacy of the financial sector. A well-functioning financial sector promotes
savings and investments that create jobs and produce the goods and services that people need, thereby contributing to a society’s
wealth, resilience, sustainability and welfare. However, the financial sector has been misallocating funds and failing to deliver the
expected benefits. For example, about 85% of the business of banking in the US consists of buying and selling existing assets, rather
than funding the development of new assets. In addition, unemployment, poverty and inequality are increasing around the world and
many societies are showing symptoms of social fragility, such as substance abuse, breakdown of families and intolerance.
[2]
 Financial
institutions are also funding projects around the world that are having profoundly adverse impacts on people, communities and the
environment.[3]
The fact that the operations of financial institutions, financial markets and financial regulators inevitably affect people means that they
cannot avoid having human rights impacts. Consequently, it is noteworthy that the SSBs have not developed standards for dealing with
these human rights impacts. Their failure to do so increases the chances that the financial sector will under-estimate the risks and over-
estimate the benefits of its activities. This in turn increases the risk that it misallocates credit and overestimates the safety and
soundness of financial institutions, the efficiency of financial markets and the stability of the financial system.
This paper argues that the SSBs and their members can mitigate this risk by adopting a human rights based approach to financial
regulation. In order to make this case, the paper is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview of the international financial
regulatory standards. The second discusses how human rights can contribute to the work of the SSBs. The third is a conclusion.
The SSBs and the International Financial Regulatory Standards
There are fifteen SSBs.
[4]
 They have developed the regulatory standards that are included in the compendium of international economic
and financial standards (the Compendium) maintained by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which operates as a coordinating body for
the SSBs
[5]
.
Space does not permit a full discussion of all the SSBs. Consequently, the paper focuses on the three most prominent SSBs. They are
the forums in which the regulators of the banking, securities and the insurance industries meet.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the “primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of banks”.[6] Its
members are representatives of independent supervisory agencies or central banks from 28 countries. They are expected to incorporate
the standards that they have developed in the BCBS into their national laws and regulations. In addition, despite its limited membership,
the BCBS’s mandate is to “strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide”.[7]
The BCBS has two prominent international standards. The first establishes a framework to promote the resilience of banks.[8] The most
recent version of this standard, Basel III, uses three tests—a risk-weighted capital to assets ratio, a liquidity coverage ratio and a net
stable funding ratio—to assess the adequacy of a bank’s capital.[9] It also establishes three criteria—capital adequacy, governance and
risk management practices and the quality of public disclosures--that investors and regulators can use to assess the robustness of
financial institutions.
The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision[10] stipulates 29 principles with which banking supervisory authorities should
conform to if they are to effectively oversee the safety and soundness of their banks. The principles deal with the powers and functions of
banking supervisors and their supervisory responsibilities.   
The second SSB is the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) whose members are the regulators of securities
markets in 115 jurisdictions.[11] It “develops, implements, and promotes adherence to internationally recognized standards for securities
regulation” and facilitates cooperation among securities regulators.[12] Its most prominent standard is the IOSCO Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation.[13] These 38 principles deal with the powers and functions of the regulators of securities markets,
protection of investors, ensuring that securities markets are “fair, efficient and transparent” and managing systemic risk in financial
markets.
The third SSB is the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) whose members are “insurance regulators and
supervisors of more than 200 jurisdictions”.[14] Its goal is to promote consistent and effective regulation of the insurance industry so that
insurance markets are fair, safe and stable. The Insurance Core Principles stipulate 26 principles to promote an insurance supervisory
authority that is independent, accountable and transparent and that can oversee a fair, safe and stable insurance industry.[15]
Although none of the international financial regulatory standards are legally binding, there are some de facto means for enforcing them.
[16] For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank use them in preparing their individual country Reports on
Standards and Codes (ROSCs).[17] These reports assess how well the country is complying with the provisions of these standards and
codes. The IMF may use this information in its policy discussions with the member state and it may influence the technical assistance the
IMF and World Bank offer the member state. In principle, the IMF and/or the World Bank can also use this information in developing the
conditions that they attach to any financing that they offer to the member state.
Financial markets offer another mechanism for de facto enforcement. A state’s failure to comply with the standards may adversely affect
its access to financing and its cost of funds.[18]
Given their limited memberships, it is ironic that the SSBs’ standards may, because of the ROSCs and market forces, become more
enforceable in countries that do not participate in their formulation than in some of those that do.
Human Rights and the SSBs
The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “every organ of society …shall strive…to promote respect” for
human rights and to secure their “universal and effective recognition and observance”.
[19]
 The SSBs, their member regulatory authorities
and all financial institutions qualify as “organs of society”. They therefore, have a responsibility to respect human rights. This means that
their actions should be consistent with human rights principles. In addition, they should not do anything that undermines efforts by other
actors to meet their own human rights obligations and responsibilities.
The national financial regulatory authorities that participate in the SSBs are agencies or instrumentalities of sovereign states that have
signed human rights treaties and that are bound by applicable customary international law principles. Consequently, they are bound by
the commitments of their home states. This includes protecting, respecting and working to fulfil human rights both in their national
regulatory work and in their participation in the SSBs.
Despite their human rights responsibilities and obligations, the SSBs and their participating national regulatory authorities have not
addressed the human rights impacts of the financial sector. Their failure to do so is implicitly a decision to externalize the human rights
impacts of their standards and the transactions entered into pursuant to them. This in turn risks exacerbating the adverse human rights
impacts of any particular standard.  
It is important to note that while finance can impact all human rights, there are some human rights that are implicated in almost all
financial activity. These are: 
The right of non-discrimination
[20]
. This applies to questions of access to financial services, the range of products that financial
institutions offer and their suitability for the needs of their consumers, and to the inclusiveness of the financial system.
The right of access to information
[21]
. In order for the financial system to function effectively, all its participants need sufficient
information to make informed decisions.
The right to privacy
[22]
. Since information plays such a critical role in financial decision making there is a risk that financial
institutions may ask for inappropriate information or will mismanage
[23]
 or misuse the information that they receive.
The right to an effective remedy.
[24]
 This right becomes relevant when other human rights are infringed. This can happen, for
example, when individuals are deemed to be undesirable customers by financial institutions, when they are accused of engaging
in unlawful conduct in financial markets or of using the financial system for unlawful purposes.
Economic, social and cultural rights: Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
stipulates that signatory states must use “maximum available resources” to progressively realize economic social and cultural
rights. This article, thus, acknowledges that, based on local conditions, not all signatories may be in a position to provide all ESC
rights to all their citizens at the time they become parties to the ICESCR. As a result, they are obliged to work “progressively”
towards the goal of full realization of these rights. It also stipulates that states must use the “maximum” and not necessarily “all”
available resources for this purpose. It is important to note, however, that “maximum available resources” include human,
regulatory and supervisory resources, as well as financial resources. The way in which finance is allocated will also have
implications for the realization of such economic and social rights as the rights to education, access to health and to work.
The Costs and Benefits of a Human Rights Based Approach
A human rights based approach can benefit financial regulation by contributing to a more accurate assessment of the true costs and
benefits of proposed international standards. However, by adding additional tasks to the standard-making process, a human rights
approach will increase the costs of making and implementing international regulatory standards.
The Benefits of a Human Rights Approach
Human rights can add value to international financial standard setting in a number of different ways.
First, a human rights approach by making transparent the impacts of proposed standards on individual savers, investors and consumers
of financial services helps the SSBs and their members develop a disaggregated understanding of the positive and negative impacts of
any standard on the different groups of stakeholders in the standard. This should help them formulate standards that optimize the
positive and mitigate the negative impacts of the standard on the stakeholders in the financial sector. This information should enable
them to more accurately assess how well the financial system is performing all its functions, the safety and soundness of individual
financial institutions, the efficiency and fairness of financial markets and the sustainability and stability of the system. Such an approach,
for example, will ensure that the regulators capture the impact of the Basel standards on the ICESCR requirement that states and their
agencies allocate maximum available resources to the progressive realization of ESCR. This information can only be garnered from an
explicit human rights analysis.
Second, a human rights based approach will require regulators and the SSBs to more actively engage with all the stakeholders who may
be affected by a proposed standard and exchange views with them about the content of the standard and their possible responses to the
standard. This increased engagement should provide the SSBs with new information that makes it easier for them to identify and
address any unintended consequences of the proposed standard. It should also promote standards that are as responsive as possible to
the needs of the regulators, the regulated entities and their customers.
Third, in order to conduct an effective human rights analysis, the formulators of the standards will need to be transparent and open to
participation by all stakeholders. This in turn should increase confidence that the international standards are serving the needs of all
stakeholders in the financial value chain. It should also enhance their legitimacy and credibility, thereby making the standards more
robust.
The Costs of the Human Rights Approach
A human rights based approach to regulation has two significant downsides. First, it is inevitable that the cost of developing international
standards will increase if the SSBs and national regulatory authorities need to undertake a human rights risk assessment for each
proposed and adopted standard. Furthermore, the costs of monitoring and evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of these
standards will rise.
Second, there is a risk that requiring financial regulators to incorporate human rights related tasks into their work could potentially
compromise their independence. Given that human rights impacts are hard to quantify, the regulators and supervisors will need to
exercise some discretion in deciding how to manage these impacts. The way in which they exercise their discretion may subject them to
increased scrutiny and political pressure, possibly leading to calls for them to be subjected to more oversight and to having less
independence.
The Benefits Outweigh the Costs
As indicated above, the negative human rights impacts will occur regardless of whether financial regulatory standards account for them.
This means that currently the SSBs, their members and their regulated entities are incorrectly calculating the costs and benefits of their
actions. This leads to distortions in the allocation of finance and imposes opportunity costs, measured in economic, financial, and human
rights terms, on society.
Making the human rights costs more transparent will help reduce these distortions and costs. This, in turn, will have beneficial effects on
the safety of financial institutions, the efficiency of financial markets and the stability of the financial system. It will also have a positive
effect on the allocation of financial resources and on financial inclusion, thereby promoting a financial system that helps make societies
wealthier and contributes to their resilience, stability and welfare.
It is important to note in this regard, that the SSBs can mitigate the costs of adopting a human rights based approach by learning from
the experience that financial institutions have gained from their use of some of the most relevant international standards namely the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)[25] and the Equator Principles (EPs).[26]
The UNGPs consists of 31 non-binding principles that were unanimously adopted by the state representatives on the United Nations
Human Rights Council in 2011. The UNGPs have three pillars, dealing with the human rights obligations of states, the human rights
responsibilities of companies and the need to offer remedies to affected parties. The responsibility of companies to respect human rights
means that they should avoid infringing human rights and should address the adverse human rights impacts of their own operations and
those in which they are directly involved. The principles also stipulate that businesses should have human rights policies that are
approved at a high level in the company and are publicly available. The UNGPs clearly state that companies should have in place due
diligence procedures to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for the human rights impacts of their operations.
A small group of banks have formed the Thun Group to encourage the incorporation of the UNGPs into the operations of banks.[27]
Although most financial institutions are not participants in this group, many of the major international financial institutions, in fact, have
adopted human rights policies and/or express support for human rights in their public reports. These include, for example, thirty of the
thirty-eight financial institutions represented on the Board of Trustees of the Institute for International Finance.
The EPs were developed by representatives of financial institutions working with the International Finance Corporation and some civil
society groups. They are intended to guide the conduct of signatory banks engaged in financing projects whose total capital value
exceeds $10 million. They have been adopted by 94 financial institutions in 37 countries covering the majority of projects being financed
around the world. The EPs are based on the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Sustainability Framework.[28] There have been
three iterations of the EPs since 2003 and a fourth is currently under consideration. In each case, the changes have been stimulated by
changes in the IFC’s Sustainability Framework. Currently the EPs consist of a set of performance standards dealing with environmental,
social and labor issues.
Conclusion
Financial systems are complex and changing fast. In response, the SSBs must develop international standards that respond to the
evolution of the financial system and its changing impact on social welfare, job creation, and social and economic resilience. However,
these standards will have human rights consequences regardless of whether or not the standards account for them. Such costs are
particularly high when they fall on those who cannot easily bear them. Consequently, it is preferable that the SSBs incorporate a human
rights approach into their standard making process. This will not only make the costs and benefits of the proposed standard more
transparent but will also increase the capacity of the SSBs and their members to ensure that the standards do not impose
disproportionate burdens on some of the more vulnerable stakeholders in their work.
There are precedents for expanding financial sector rulemaking to include non-financial factors. This has been done in regard to
promoting financial inclusion in financial systems across all continents. The Financial Stability Board has also encouraged the SSBs to
reflect on their specific roles and responsibilities in relation to climate change. While these are both welcome developments, they should
not be viewed as obviating the need for a human rights approach to financial regulation.
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